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S I L E N T P A R T N E R S : T H E R O L E OF U N P A I D
M A R K E T L A B O R IN F A M I L I E S
Lisa Philipps

ABSTRA CT
The term ‘‘unpaid market labor’’ refers to the direct contributions of unpaid
family members to market work that officially belongs to another member of
the household. Thus one individual may be construed legally as an owner or
entrepreneur, but relatives may help out informally with business operations.
Likewise, in corporate or public-service settings, certain employees rely on the
unpaid help of an executive spouse or political wife. This paper argues that
unpaid market labor is conceptually distinct from both paid work and unpaid
domestic labor. Legal cases from Canada are used to illustrate the policy
implications of this insight and how dichotomous thinking about the market
and the family obscures this kind of work. The article discusses insights and
challenges for feminist political economy in theorizing unpaid market labor.

KEYW ORDS
Gender inequality, taxation, unpaid work

INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses a form of unpaid work that has largely been invisible in
studies of both paid and unpaid labor in highly industrialized countries
such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia: the
involvement of family members in bread-winning activities that are the
official responsibility of only one person in the household. To offer a few
classic examples, this is the work of the unpaid relative who helps out in the
back room of the family business, the executive spouse who organizes

corporate functions, the political wife who campaigns with and informally
advises her husband, or the farm wife who shares in operations and
management but lacks formal status as a co-owner or employee. The term
‘‘unpaid market labor’’ is used here to describe these and other
contributions to the paid work of individuals who are construed legally
and socially as individual employees, public officials, or entrepreneurs. It
reflects this paper’s overarching claim that unpaid market labor is distinct
from both unpaid domestic labor and paid market work in ways that matter
to feminist legal and economic theory.
Unpaid market labor does not map easily onto the familiar dichotomies
of market versus family and paid versus unpaid work that frame most
feminist as well as conventional analyses of Western women’s labor. Though
provided in a familial context, it goes beyond the childcare, housekeeping,
and other tasks generally understood as domestic. It includes tasks that are
harder to distinguish from the work of the remunerated family member,
are often done in the same physical location, and contribute more visibly to
market earnings. Yet, unpaid market labor is not directly remunerated and
does not carry the legal rights or obligations of employment or selfemployment.
This paper seeks to demonstrate both the public-policy relevance of
unpaid market labor and its significance for feminist political economic

theory. It draws upon tax judgments from Canada to illustrate how this
form of work often disappears into a conceptual gap between market and
family labor, obscuring its many implications for economic gender
equality. Yet the sociological studies reviewed here show that unpaid
market labor is essential to family livelihoods in highly industrialized
countries, in a wide variety of economic sectors and class settings. These
findings raise new questions for feminist theorizing about labor markets
and the care economy. Greater attention to unpaid market labor may
show that markets and households are not just interdependent, but
fundamentally inseparable in the process of social reproduction. In order
to address these questions, more detailed empirical knowledge is
required about the nature and extent of unpaid market labor being
undertaken by different population

groups across industries and

countries.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF UNPAID MARKET LABOR: THE
EXAMPLE OF TAXATION LAW
This research began through my teaching of Canadian taxation law when I
encountered cases in which individual taxpayers argued that some portion
of their income should be attributed to an unpaid family member who

actively assisted with the taxpayer’s business or employment duties. I review
a small selection of these cases to illustrate how unpaid market labor tends
to fall into a conceptual blind spot between waged work and domestic life
in Canada and the difficulties this poses for adjudicators and policy makers.
Similar issues are likely to arise under the income tax laws of other
countries and in a range of other public policy fields.
Unpaid work is officially outside the scope of the Canadian income tax,
which like other income tax systems around the world, is designed to catch
only monetized forms of income and expense. Indeed, feminist legal
scholars have argued that one of the main sources of gender bias in tax
policy is its tendency to focus exclusively on market income and to
disregard the economic benefits flowing from household production
(Nancy C. Staudt 1996; Lisa Philipps 2002). Unpaid work is not taxed
directly but can still generate tax issues because of its close relationship to
the income-earning activities of another individual or firm. The technical
issues vary among cases and countries, but the common theme is that a
business owner or employee seeks to avoid tax on some portion of their
income, which they argue is properly allocated to a family member who
provided informal assistance with the work. Thus, the taxpayers in these
cases seek to characterize the family member’s work as a form of productive
and commercially valuable labor, even though it was not compensated in

money. The revenue authorities, on the other hand, seek to characterize
the unpaid work as a personal, familial activity, or even a form of leisure,
unrelated to the earning of income. Judges must choose between these
dichotomous characterizations for purposes of determining tax liability.
The decisions fall into two groups, described here as the ‘‘executive
spouse’’ cases and the ‘‘family business’’ cases.

The executive spouse
These cases deal with employees whose spouses accompany them on
business trips at the company’s expense. The legal issue in Canada is
whether the employer’s payment of a spouse’s travel costs constitutes a
taxable benefit to the employee. This in turn depends on whether the
spouse’s presence was primarily for the employee’s personal benefit (in
which case it is taxable), or primarily for the benefit of the employer (in
which case it is non-taxable). The cases discussed below were decided
between 1966 and 1996 and most involve management or executive level
employees. With one exception, they all deal with male employees
accompanied by their wives. In all the cases involving male employees,
the Courts referred to evidence about the tasks done by the wives. The
most pervasive theme is the wives’ role in mediating relationships. They

facilitated interactions with business associates, suppliers, or customers and
otherwise nurtured the social framework for business activity. The wives
attended training seminars alongside their husbands; hosted and attended
receptions, dinners, and other social events; and were often responsible
for shepherding and monitoring the wives of lower-level employees
attending the convention or meeting. While the fact patterns are often
similar in these cases, the judgments are divided between those that
characterize the spouse’s accompaniment as mere personal companionship
(giving rise to a taxable benefit) and those that determine the spouse to be
contributing to the business aims of the trip.
Taxpayers invariably argued that spouses were along to serve the
employers’ business interests. For example, in Shambrook v. Minister of
National Revenue, the president of a metalwares company argued:
It was necessary for [his wife] . . . to accompany him to the President’s
Reception and Buffet Supper, to take part in other social activities
attended by delegates and their wives during the course of the
convention, to meet and fraternize with the wives of others attending
the convention, and thus promote a general atmosphere of friendship
and goodwill with both competitors and customers (or potential
customers). (Tax Appeal Board 1966: 21).

The Tax Appeal Board rejected this portrayal of the wife’s activities and
held that the company had conferred a taxable benefit on the husband by
paying her travel expenses:
[T]he benefit received by Mr. Shambrook . . . might properly be said to
have been of a personal nature in that he had been able to enjoy the
companionship of his wife at the convention as well as the social
advantages of attending the various functions as her escort rather than
alone. (Tax Appeal Board 1966: 23)
This reasoning was echoed in Paton v. Minister of National Revenue (Tax
Appeal Board 1968), when a senior executive of a bank argued that there
was a business purpose for his wife’s attendance at regional meetings,
especially so that she could evaluate the wives of local branch managers. He
stated:
[E]xperience has shown that in the operation of a branch the manager’s
wife can play an important role in the business development and
servicing fields. Because of this, it is important that the wife be aware of
the bank’s objectives and that the bank be in a position to assess the
wife’s contribution. In making this evaluation . . . the executive’s wife can
be of considerable assistance. (Tax Appeal Board 1968: 198)
In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument and upholding the government’s

assessment of a taxable benefit the Board questioned the skills that Mrs. Paton
could bring to this role:
There is no evidence that Mrs. Paton spent any time in the head office of
the bank to learn the intricacies of banking practice; neither was there
any evidence that she had any special fitness or training to enable her to
pass judgment on the abilities and qualities of the various people she
would meet fleetingly at the social function . . . (Tax Appeal Board 1968:
201).
The courts in Shambrook and Paton therefore saw the wives’ activities as
fundamentally personal and not part of the networking, advertising, customer
relations, and human resources management that are essential to the
generation of business profits.
A valid policy concern of both revenue authorities and Courts in these
cases is to prevent tax avoidance by high-income earners who seek merely
to shift income to a spouse in a lower tax bracket, as suggested by the
following passage:
Mr. Paton’s tax return shows him to be in receipt of a highly substantial
salary as one would expect of a senior executive in one of the chartered
banks in Canada. Nevertheless he seeks to be relieved of taxation in
respect of the . . . expenses incurred on behalf of his wife when she

accompanied him to Western Canada. (Tax Appeal Board 1968: 201).
From this perspective, the cases appear to pit the interests of class (or
vertical) equity against the recognition of women’s unpaid labor. This
framing of the issue places class and gender equality interests in conflict,
not unlike Symes vs. The Queen, in which a Canadian lawyer sought
unsuccessfully to deduct her nanny’s salary as an expense of carrying on
business (Supreme Court of Canada 1994; Audrey Macklin 1992). Notably,
however, the courts in the Paton and Shambrook cases did not challenge the
business nature of social hosting activities for the executives themselves.
They had no difficulty recognizing the employees’ own attendance at
receptions and dinners as part of the income-earning process. The fact that
these events also met the executives’ personal needs for food, drink, and
entertainment raised no problem of class inequity for the courts.
Indeed other cases from the same time period (late 1960s/early 1970s) in
Canada reached the opposite conclusion by allowing travel expenses for an
executive spouse to be reimbursed without tax. A good example is Hale v.
Canada, where the manager of an insurance company brought his wife to a
conference of insurance brokers held at a resort in Phoenix, Arizona at the
company’s expense (Exchequer Court 1969). The Court held there was no
taxable benefit to Mr. Hale due to his wife’s extensive involvement in
conference activities and the fact that her presence was ‘‘tantamount to

being obligatory’’ within the corporate culture of the insurance company
(Exchequer Court 1969: 262). This case provides a fascinating glimpse of
the extent to which certain employers have relied upon executive spouses to
help run their operations. As the court found,

The company has a strong preference for married men over those who
are unmarried. It does not hire an applicant as a salesman . . . if his wife
does not meet the company standards. The wife is interviewed separately
and in person prior to hiring the husband, and . . . when [Mr. Hale]
engaged a salesman this interview of the applicant’s wife was done by his
wife who reported her assessment of the [applicant’s] wife to him. The
company maintains a direct liaison with the wife through all stages of her
husband's career. She is sent correspondence and pamphlets giving
instructions and guidance on how to help her husband . . . Canada Life
regards the combination of the husband and wife as the selling unit in
the business and takes active steps to foster the wife’s participation, but
they do not pay her. (Exchequer Court 1969: 261)

The tasks that the court considered as relevant to the business objectives of
the conference included the following:
Mrs. Hale assumed the responsibility of looking after wives of the

salesmen, arranging the assignment of rooms in congenial company,
finding their baggage lost in transit, urging their attendance at the
business sessions and observing and reporting any absentees to her
husband . . . She attempted to broaden her knowledge of her husband’s
business by attending their instructional meetings . . . She acted as the
appellant’s hostess at informal gatherings arranged by her husband for
his colleagues and their wives . . . In short she acted as a kind of mother
superior to the branch salesmen’s wives. (Exchequer Court 1969: 263)
Contrary to the Shambrook and Paton cases discussed above, the court in Hale
was satisfied that ‘‘this was not a holiday for her at the company’s expense’’
(Exchequer Court 1969: 264). Likewise in Philp vs. Canada, where the
taxpayer managed a grocery store, the court found that wives contributed
useful knowledge about the preferences of women customers and also
ensured the convention would be ‘‘more orderly and businesslike’’
(implying they would discourage wild behavior by the men) (Exchequer
Court 1970: 500).
While the images of the corporate spouse in these cases may seem
outdated, very similar issues arose in Lowe v. Her Majesty the Queen (Federal
Court of Appeal 1996). Mrs. Lowe accompanied her husband, an account
executive with an insurance company, on a trip to New Orleans. The trip
was an incentive reward for independent brokers who sold the company’s

products, and the Lowes were responsible for guiding and assisting brokers
and their wives and nurturing relationships with them throughout the
‘‘four sun-filled days and fun-filled nights’’ promised in the program
(Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6228 – 9). In holding that Mrs. Lowe’s
company-paid travel did not constitute a taxable benefit to Mr. Lowe, the
Court acknowledged that times had changed, and spouses probably are not
as heavily obliged to attend such functions as they were at the time of Hale
(Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6230). Nonetheless, Mrs. Lowe did attend,
and the Court found she spent virtually all her time assisting her husband.
This included attending a training session with her husband on ‘‘how to
deal with the brokers, when to discuss business during the four days, where
to sit during meals and also to arrange meetings with brokers and senior
management’’ (Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6227). For example, account
executives were told to encourage brokers and their wives to sign up for
guided tours, and while on the tours, Mrs. Lowe would talk with the other
wives while Mr. Lowe discussed business with the brokers. Given their
constant involvement with such activities, the Court held that any personal
enjoyment was ‘‘merely incidental to what was primarily a business trip by
both spouses for the purpose of advancing the employer’s business
interests’’ (Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6230).
The Lowe case suggests that the executive-spouse role is not a mere relic

of the past. While fewer women may be full-time executive spouses to the
exclusion of their own careers, this has not made the role obsolete. Rather,
unpaid market labor is more likely being transformed along with other
aspects of women’s work. It may be provided more intermittently as an
additional shift of labor by a spouse with a paid job of her own, or it may
draw upon skills or status acquired by women through their own careers.
Despite such changes, the Lowe case reflects a continued reliance upon
women to facilitate the human relationships needed for business success.
An important question is whether women employees have comparable
access to the services of an executive spouse, as they seek higher positions in
corporate management. One case from 1993 dealt with a woman
operations manager who was asked by her employer to join a group
traveling to Japan to visit the offices of a key supplier. The court found that
the trip ‘‘was not merely offered to her . . . she was politely, but I gathered
firmly, requested to go’’ to avoid the embarrassment of spaces being left
open (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para.7). The employer also requested
that she take her husband. She agreed with some reluctance in light of the
cost to her husband’s own work time and possibly vacation time. It is
notable that none of the other cases mentioned any concerns about the
personal or career costs to wives of accompanying their husbands on
business travel.

Though acknowledging the relatively mandatory nature of the trip, the
Court held that the reimbursement of the husband’s expenses was a taxable
benefit ‘‘since his trip was of no benefit to the company of which I am
aware’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para. 15), and since Ms. McMillan
ultimately made the choice to include him. Justice Taylor stated: although
‘‘rejecting that condition might have meant she did not go on the trip, I
regard it as a conscious decision to take the opportunity on her part’’ (Tax
Court of Canada 1993: para. 16). In contrast to the cases discussed earlier,
the judge did not describe the husband’s specific activities but mentioned
only that the itinerary included ‘‘the usual mix of social events’’ and more
direct business activities (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para. 3). There was no
recognition that the husband was assisting his wife or her employer to
achieve the business objectives of the trip, even though his physical
presence was obviously thought to be important to make the right impression
on the supplier. As a result, the value of his trip was added to
McMillan’s employment income for tax purposes.
Overall, then, Canadian tax jurisprudence has been conflicted about
whether the activities of an executive spouse primarily serve a business or
family purpose. While factual distinctions can of course be identified, they
are not so obvious as to explain by themselves why the Courts reached
opposing conclusions in these cases. The same pattern of seemingly

irreconcilable decisions repeats itself in the family business cases.

The family business
In these cases, the taxpayer owns a business and attempts to split the profits
for income tax purposes with a family member who is taxed at a lower rate.
Taxpayers have an incentive to split income with lower earners under any
system of progressive rates, though the technical means employed will vary
with the economic circumstances and depending on how the tax law is
designed. Many jurisdictions have struggled to define when income
splitting is inappropriate and to draft effective anti-avoidance rules
(Maureen Donnelly, Joanne Magee, and Allister Young 2000; UK Inland
Revenue n.d.). A key issue in some cases is whether the family member
provided business-related services that justify an allocation of profits or
wages. Disputes can then arise over the nature and value of unpaid market
labor. The difficulty of knowing when authorities or courts will characterize
such work as business or personal activity is illustrated by two cases, Cullen
vs. Canada (Tax Court of Canada 1985a) and Wessell vs. Canada (Tax Court
Canada 1985b).
In both cases, the taxpayer claimed he was carrying on a business
partnership with his wife, who was therefore entitled to report a share of

profits. The court reached opposite decisions in the two cases despite
strikingly similar fact patterns. Both involved small businesses in which the
husband initially reported all the income as a sole proprietor and later
switched to filing as a partnership on the advice of professional
accountants. The evidence established that the businesses were managed
and operated jointly by husband and wife. However, there was no written
partnership agreement, nor did the wife receive wages or any other formal
compensation for her labor. The issue was whether the couple met the
legal

definition

of

partnership

as

a

relationship

between

persons

‘‘carrying on a business in common, with a view of profit’’ (Tax Court of
Canada 1985a: 412).1 As both judges acknowledged, the absence of a
written contract is not fatal if the parties’ conduct indicates there was an
oral or implied partnership agreement (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 412;
Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 208 – 9). Evidence detailing how the couples
shared responsibility for their businesses reveals strong parallels between
the two cases.
The Wessells operated three separate enterprises: a trailer park, a farm, and a
construction business. The court found that Mrs. Wessell contributed to the
‘‘physical requirements’’ of all three; she also negotiated contracts and
‘‘was

recognized and accepted by the public as an active and

authoritative person in the operation’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 207).

Justice Taylor commented:
[I]n many aspects of the operations Mrs. Wessell acted and functioned
virtually independently of the appellant – her husband – indeed without
even consulting him, while at the same time on many other aspects he
consulted with her before signing contracts, buying equipment, etc. It
could well be said that in matters of finance she was actually in control of
the funds. (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 207)
The couple divided their labor differently in each of their businesses: ‘‘With
regard to the construction business, the appellant was the major element, and his
wife did provide substantial assistance. For the ‘trailer park’ . . . Mrs. Wessell
was the major motivator, consulted and aided by Mr. Wessell’’ (Tax Court
of Canada 1985b: 209). Based on their conduct, the court held that the
Wessells had a valid partnership that was affirmed by their decision to file
tax returns as partners, each reporting a share of the profits from each
business (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 209).
As in the Wessell case, the Cullens also had three businesses: an oil
distributorship, a farm, and a racehorse operation. With respect to the farm,
the judge found that both spouses were ‘‘equally involved in all
aspects of the operation’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 410). In addition to
a wide range of manual and marketing tasks, ‘‘Caroline was fully involved in

all decisions . . . and it was her particular responsibility to maintain the
necessary books and records’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 410). Later she
was also heavily involved in the oil agency:
The nature of the business was such that at certain times . . . Cullen would
be required to spend all of his time away from the agency office . . . As a
result Caroline was the person responsible for the day to day management of the agency. This included everything from answering the
telephone to the preparing and rendering of accounts to customers. She
did all of the banking, kept all the books of account, and in recent years
has had the responsibility for the operation of the computer . . . It was her
evidence that . . . she customarily worked five days a week from 8:30 in the
morning to 5:00 in the afternoon (and often longer during busy seasons).
She has never been paid a salary. (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 411)
Likewise both spouses were involved in all decisions relating to the
racehorse operation, and Mrs. Cullen maintained ‘‘all of the racing
documents, breeding records and the books of account’’ (Tax Court of
Canada 1985a: 411).
In this case, however, the court found there was no legal partnership,
stressing that most assets as well as loans and advertisements were held in Mr.
Cullen’s name alone (though Caroline had an interest in farm land pledged

as security for a loan and had signing authority on bank accounts) (Tax
Court of Canada 1985a: 411, 413). With respect to the oil distributorship, the
couple testified that Imperial Oil would not allow Mrs. Cullen to sign the
purchase documents as a partner but insisted on dealing with Mr. Cullen
alone (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 411). Justice Sarchuk gave little credence
to this testimony, questioning why Mrs. Cullen did not speak to her lawyer or
accountant about challenging this policy if partnership status was truly
important to her (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 414). The court concluded
that although the couple pooled their assets upon marriage, ‘‘this was
incidental to the formation of the family unit’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a:
414). In contrast to the decision in Wessell, Mrs. Cullen’s contribution of
unpaid labor was construed ultimately as a function of the family relationship
and not as evidence of a business relationship. The contradictory results in
these two cases highlights the law’s ambivalence about the nature of such
activities and the awkwardness of placing them solely on one side or the other
of the business/personal divide.
As a group, the executive spouse and family business cases from Canada
raise difficult questions about how best to ensure equitable treatment of
those who provide unpaid market labor. The cases that refused to
recognize the business nature of the spouses’ activities directly devalued
their work. Yet in the others, where the taxpayers won their cases, the effect

was merely to reduce the male breadwinner’s tax burden with no guarantee
of compensation actually being received by the spouse. In fact, the protaxpayer decisions discouraged the creation of formal partnership or
employment contracts with spouses, since the benefits of income splitting
can be obtained without doing so. Parallel issues are likely to arise under
the tax regimes of other countries such as the US, England, and Australia.
However, this policy conundrum cannot be resolved within the narrow
conceptual confines of tax law. Rather, it suggests the need to rethink more
broadly the role of unpaid relatives in securing family livelihoods. Doing so
will have implications not just for tax law but many aspects of public policy,
as discussed briefly in the concluding part of this article.

THEORIZING UNPAID MARKET LABOR
Beyond specific problems of legal policy, the tax cases discussed above raise
several larger questions for feminist political and economic theory. First
among these is whether unpaid market labor is properly described as
‘‘unpaid’’ work. Even if not directly remunerated, might it be paid for
indirectly through higher wages or profits to the official market actor that
are then shared within the household among those who have contributed
to the enterprise? Historical studies of cottage industries in England and

Canada have found that women and children were involved directly in
production, and family wages were set explicitly by reference to the number
of household members participating in the work (Ivy Pinchbeck 1969:
121 – 2; Paul Phillips and Erin Phillips 1993: 12 – 14). In contemporary
times, it seems likely that having a family member available to help with
one’s work could boost the earning capacity of an individual employee or
entrepreneur. This may help explain the wage premium enjoyed by
married men in certain professional and corporate contexts in highly
industrialized countries (Belinda Hewitt, Mark Western, and Janeen Baxter
2005). Certainly, the literature on Northern family business identifies
access to a flexible supply of both paid and unpaid labor within the family
as a key comparative advantage (Jane Wheelock 1992; Peter Leach, Bruce
Ball, and Garry Duncan 2003: 7).
Even if it could be demonstrated empirically that unpaid market labor
sometimes translates into a higher cash income for the official breadwinner, the other family member may remain unpaid in the sense of lacking
legal title to or decision-making power over that income. Neither equal
sharing nor equal control of resources can be assumed within such families
(Shelley Phipps and Frances Woolley 2006). The notion that unpaid market
labor will be compensated indirectly within the family is vulnerable to the
same criticisms that feminists have leveled at the family wage system of

industrial capitalism: that it both assumes and promotes women’s economic
dependence on male breadwinners (Alice Kessler-Harris 2001). Moreover,
searching for wage premiums suggests that markets can differentiate
among individuals on the basis of who has access to the services of an
unpaid family member. If market work is presumed instead to be collective
by nature, such that reliance on unpaid market labor is the norm rather
than the exception, then wage premiums are unlikely to account for all
such work.
A further question is whether unpaid market labor is a mere vestige of
the family-wage ideal, of declining relevance in many industrialized countries
as women increasingly take on waged work of their own. Even two decades
ago, Hillary Callan observed that employers in the UK could no longer
‘‘unreflectingly count on a wife’s willingness to provide unpaid and
unrecognized services. The growing visibility of symmetrical marriages,
female executives and men in the position of ‘spouse’ has undermined many
of the symbolic associations, as well as the concrete expectations’’ of earlier
times (1984: 4). As more women gain access to the upper tiers of the labor
market in industrialized countries (Sylvia Walby 2000: 165 – 97; Lourdes
Beneria 2003: 121 – 4), or enter self-employment in their own right (Karen
D. Hughes 1999), how is this likely to affect the provision of unpaid market
labor and its distribution among men and women? This question really has two

aspects: (1) whether women will adjust to such changes by providing less
unpaid market labor to family breadwinners, and (2) whether women’s own
market opportunities will be affected by their access, or lack thereof, to
unpaid market labor provided by other family members. It would be
problematic simply to assume that women are relieved of unpaid market labor
when they obtain their own paid jobs. Feminist research has demonstrated that
while gendered work patterns in the US have shifted to some extent, even
employed women still do more childcare and other unpaid household work
than men and are more likely to hold poorer jobs on the so-called ‘‘mommy
track’’ (Carmen Sirianni and Cynthia Negrey 2000; Joan Williams 2000).
Similarly, women’s changing labor-force participation seems more likely to
transform rather than eliminate the provision of unpaid market labor. Those
pursuing a masculine career model of exclusive dedication to the job will still
face competitive pressures to enlist their wives’ assistance in various
technical, clerical, social hosting, counseling, charitable, and other statusmainte- nance functions (Sirianni and Negrey 2000: 67; see also Rosabeth Moss
Kanter 1977: 106). Recent qualitative studies in Anglo-American countries
have reported that women provide such services as a third shift, over and
above their domestic responsibilities and their own waged work (Marian
Binkley 2002: 33 – 5; Barbara R. Rowe and Gong-Soog Hong 2000: 3),
sometimes compromising their own positions in the labor market to

accommodate a husband’s need for business help (Susan Baines and Jane
Wheelock 1998: 588 – 90). Indeed, research by Baines and Wheelock suggests
that the flexibilization of labor markets in the late twentieth century is probably
increasing the importance of unpaid market labor, as many UK families become
‘‘re-embedded in the economic institution of the new small business’’
(1998: 580, 582).
Nor has the role of full-time ‘‘corporate wife’’ entirely disappeared in
these countries (Anne Kingston 2001; Linda Rhodes 2003). Indeed, as
businesses expand globally and certain employees are called upon to travel
and relocate frequently, it may become even harder to sustain two careers
within one family. Some corporate wives assert their role is becoming more
not less intensive, as expectations rise about women’s business knowledge
and work becomes more geographically mobile (Betsy Morris 1998). This
observation resonates with the case discussed earlier in which Mrs. Cullen
assumed responsibility for operating the computer in the later years of the
family business.
There is also some evidence that unequal access to unpaid market labor
constrains women’s career success. The McMillan case discussed above
serves as a concrete example of how women employees may be
disadvantaged in this regard. McMillan’s decision to accede to employer
pressure to bring her husband on the business trip was made reluctantly,

with an awareness that it conflicted with his own employment and personal
priorities. More broadly, one study of Canadian women business owners
found they generally had less access than male entrepreneurs to a flexible
supply of unpaid family assistance (Monica Belcourt, Ronald J. Burke, and
Hélène Lee-Gosselin 1991: 39). All of these questions call for further
empirical research.
Another consideration is how gender may be infused or even superseded
by other dimensions of power in shaping the nature and meanings of unpaid
market labor in various contexts. This is not to deny the gendered nature
of unpaid market labor or its important role in white middle-class life.
Both historically and in contemporary times, the availability of a full- time
wife dedicated to advancing her husband’s career has been a critical
signifier of bourgeois economic, sexual, and moral status (Callan 1984: 3 –
4; Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall 2002: 279 – 87). Baines and
Wheelock found that even in the new wave of micro-businesses, the division
of tasks among family members was highly gendered along traditional lines
(1998: 587 – 8). A wife’s participation in business travel or other functions
often has been made possible by shifting regular household labor to
domestic servants, often poorly paid women of color. This analysis could be
broadened to consider how and why unpaid market labor is provided in
different class settings, among families with different ethnic connections

and racialized identities, by children, husbands, and extended family,
including male relatives (Janet Finch 1983: 1 – 2). For example, some
qualitative studies of small businesses in racialized and immigrant
communities in highly industrialized countries have found that unpaid
family members including children can play a very important role in
securing the survival of the business (Kwang Chung Kim and Won Moo
Hurh 1988: 154; In-Sook Lim 1997: 4; Margaret Walton-Roberts and Daniel
Hiebert 1997: 6 – 8; Spinder Dhaliwal 1998). Industrial homeworkers are
another group likely to incorporate family members, including children,
into the labor process in order to speed production and attempt to generate
a living wage for the household (Eileen Boris 1994: 94 – 111). These
studies suggest that more than gender is at play in determining who
provides and benefits from unpaid market labor.
Feminist theory must additionally attend to the prescriptive question of
how unpaid market labor should ideally be treated, whether by rewarding it
as a valuable form of economic contribution or by discouraging it as an
inherently oppressive practice. Particularly in the family business context,
some argue it enhances women’s agency by allowing them greater status
and influence over family economic decisions and more fulfilling work
than gender norms would otherwise permit (Seena B. Kohl 1977: 47 – 54;
Patricia A. Frishkoff and Bonnie M. Brown 1993: 66 – 70; Lim 1997: 21 – 31;

Dhaliwal 1998: 463 – 74; Min-Jung Kwak 2002). From this perspective it is
possible to view joint family enterprises as positive examples of a more
cooperative, less individualistic form of market activity and a means for
women

to

reduce

conflict

between

their

market

and

household

responsibilities. At the other pole are those who view unpaid market labor
as a means of keeping educated women out of direct labor market
competition with men, by giving them a subordinate outlet for their skills
and ambition (Hanna Papanek 1973: 852 – 72). In her scathing book about
Canadian political wives, for example, journalist Susan Riley argues that
such women are ‘‘an embarrassment and disgrace to us all . . . they embody
a patriarchal notion of female virtue which involves trading off personal
power for reflected glory’’ (1987: xiii). These opposing perspectives
resonate with the longstanding debate in feminist theory over ‘‘sameness’’
versus ‘‘difference’’ approaches to gender equality (Nancy Fraser 1997).
Other feminist theorists have focused instead on explaining unpaid
market labor as a gendered practice, which supports the moral order
underpinning various stages of capitalism. For example, Davidoff and Hall
suggest that in the transition to industrial capitalism, women acted as
hidden partners in middle-class enterprises, contributing extensively to
economic production in ways that were simultaneously consistent with the
social rank of having a domestic, ‘‘non-working’’ wife (2002: 279 – 87).

Dorothy Smith focuses on the moral infrastructure of contemporary
corporate capitalism, and the crucial role of middle-class wives in signaling
the trustworthiness and class status of corporate managers (1975 – 76: 55 –
90). Her analysis suggests that corporate employers should be viewed as
major beneficiaries of women’s unpaid work, along with the individual men
whose careers are advanced. Finally, these approaches suggest that unpaid
market labor plays an important role in constructing gendered identities. It
may also be seen as a marker of heterosexual identity and privilege, though
the literature does not discuss this dimension.
Given the diversity of income-generating arrangements within families, it
seems overly simplistic to demand that all participants be compensated in
money for their work. It would be less controversial, however, to insist upon
recognizing the value of unpaid market labor as an input to market
production. This approach demands that we assess in a more contextualized fashion how to ensure equitable treatment of individuals who provide
unpaid market labor. There is a parallel here to feminist analyses of unpaid
domestic labor, many of which call for public policies to take the value and
cost of care work into account and encourage equitable sharing of such
work but not to commodify it as just another form of wage labor (Lourdes
Beneria 1999: 300 – 3; Jean Gardiner 2000: 99 – 100; Susan Himmelweit
2002; Lisa Philipps 2003: 13 – 14). To argue simply that unpaid market

labor should be eliminated by converting it to paid work risks further
reifying the market/family dichotomy as the appropriate frame for public
policy and individual subjectivity. Rather than extending the logic of
competitive markets further into social life, Jenny Cameron and J. K.
Gibson-Graham urge feminists to deconstruct the separation of production
and reproduction by studying those spaces within the market that draw
upon cooperative behavior (2003: 151 – 5). Research on unpaid market
labor can contribute to this deconstructive project by revealing the extent
to which families collaborate in work that officially belongs to an individual
breadwinner.
This last point raises the question of how unpaid market labor might fit
into theories of the care economy. Certainly, it helps to reinforce the
argument advanced by feminist economists that markets and households
are interdependent aspects of the economy, both necessary for the
production of wealth (Diane Elson 1998: 189; Nancy Folbre 2001; Marilyn
Power 2004: 6). For example, Elson’s argument that unpaid care work
maintains the social framework needed for market relations can be
presented even more strongly when unpaid market labor is included in the
picture, particularly the role that silent partners play in smoothing
commercial relationships. More profoundly, demonstrating why unpaid
market labor cannot be located comfortably in either the productive or

reproductive spheres helps expose the contingency of this boundary and
challenge its legitimacy as a basis for allocating resources (David M.
Brennan 2006).
Foregrounding family members’ direct involvement in breadwinning
challenges a central premise of much feminist work in political economy,
which posits that industrial capitalism split waged work in the market from
unwaged work in the household, replacing an earlier mode in which
households functioned as common units of production and economic
survival (Antonella Picchio 1992). As a consequence, feminist analyses of
unpaid work in Western countries have tended to focus heavily on domestic
and caregiving tasks. Some feminist research addresses subsistence
production, a category that overlaps with the concept of unpaid market
labor used in this paper, but typically it is studied in the context of lessdeveloped, agriculturally based economies (Lourdes Beneria 1982: 131 – 2;
2003: 108 – 16, 134 – 6). Studies of women’s informal work could be
expanded to consider the issues discussed in this paper. The informal sector
is generally defined to include unpaid family workers but also a wide array
of other casual and sometimes illegal activities, usually undertaken to earn
cash income and not necessarily embedded in family relations (Beneria
1999: 290 – 1). Recently economists have questioned the traditional view
that informal work recedes with industrialization and have begun to

consider its importance in the flexibilization of labor markets even in
developed countries (Martha Chen 2004).
If it can be shown that a wide range of market activities relies
systematically upon the provision of unpaid market labor by family
members, this suggests that market production has not entirely moved
outside households even in Western economies. Thus, Jane Wheelock and
Susan Baines concluded that work patterns in micro-businesses in North
East England ‘‘showed the business family as a production unit,’’ in which
survival depended heavily on a flexible supply of family labor both for the
business and to address domestic needs (1998: 59). Their study indicates
that informal and subsistence labor is crucial to economic development
even in the most industrialized settings (Wheelock and Baines 1998: 62;
Mark Granovetter 1995: 129 – 30).
All this suggests that taking unpaid market labor seriously may both
strengthen and complicate feminist political economy. While work on the
care economy has successfully troubled the ideological dichotomization of
market and household, it may also paradoxically reinforce it by calling up
the family or the household as the site of only domestic (that is, nonmarket) activities. Feminist theory has tended to challenge the production/
reproduction boundary by imagining the household as an underpinning or
source of essential inputs to the market, in the form of labor power and

cooperative social values (Isabella Bakker and Diane Elson 1998: 297;
Philipps 2003). This conceptualization demonstrates the close linkages
between caregiving and market productivity, but it can still coexist with the
notion that paid work itself is an individual undertaking. Studying unpaid
market labor has the potential to extend concepts of care beyond the work
of nurturing people who then enter markets as autonomous individuals to
better reflect the way family members work as a collective to reproduce the
family household. In addition to showing the reciprocal flow of goods and
services across the market/household boundary, then, highlighting unpaid
market labor may go somewhat further to show how these spheres overlap
and interweave.

CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA
This paper has identified unpaid market labor as a form of economic
activity that cannot be fully understood as a mere subset of unpaid domestic
or care work, nor as a form of labor-market participation per se. Rather, I
have argued that unpaid market labor deserves its own analysis as a means
of deepening feminist critiques of the ideological separation between
production and reproduction, market and family. The tax cases from
Canadian courts discussed in the first part of this paper illustrate some of

the ways in which paid workers may draw upon a family member’s
assistance and how Canadian law presently characterizes that assistance
dichotomously as either a market or domestic activity. Yet it is difficult to
advise on the ‘‘correct’’ tax treatment of this form of unpaid labor without
confronting the complex theoretical and political questions raised in the
paper’s second part. Grappling with these questions will be critical in
resolving policy debates, such as the recent one in Canada, over whether to
allow couples to split income for tax purposes even where it is legally
controlled by one of the partners alone (Frances Woolley 2007; Lisa
Philipps 2006; REAL Women of Canada 2006). Conservatives advocating
this form of notional income splitting have often cited the value of women’s
unpaid work and may see the contribution of unpaid market labor as further
bolstering this argument. Without attempting a full discussion here, a
feminist analysis would focus attention on the intrahousehold distribution
of resources and power, and whether tax benefits would be better
provided directly to those doing unpaid market work, rather than
indirectly through a tax reduction for the official breadwinner. It would
assess whether income splitting offers differential benefits depending on
factors such as class, racial and sexual identity, and family form. It would
further evaluate the incentive effects of income splitting, including whether
it

encourages reliance on

unpaid market labor or discourages

the

formalization of employment or partnership relationships within households, and it would evaluate these incentives against different visions of
gender equality.
Many other areas of public policy should also be reexamined through the
lens of unpaid market labor. For example, how should this form of
contribution affect property rights on marriage breakdown or inheritance
rights? In corporate law, what protections should be afforded to those who
provide unpaid market labor but have no legal status as directors, officers,
employees, or shareholders? Do professional estate planners have legal or
ethical obligations toward family members who have provided unpaid
market labor to their client’s business (Alysa Christmas Rollock 1998: 567)?
Corporate recruiters sometimes talk of hiring ‘‘two for the price of one,’’
acknowledging that both members of a couple will be involved in performing a
job that officially belongs only to one spouse (Kingston 2001: 27). Should
such an employer have any responsibilities toward an executive spouse, for
example, to provide a salary or a working environment free of harassment and
discrimination? Conversely, is there a need to protect those without a female
spouse from discrimination by employers who are looking for unpaid market
labor that will advance corporate interests?
A host of issues also arise in relation to self-employment. As Wheelock
and Baines argue ‘‘the entrepreneurial character of the family, not just of

the individual, needs to be examined’’ (1998: 58). For example, are the
lending policies of financial institutions or microcredit organizations fair
towards unpaid family members who are involved in a business? Should
government self-employment programs include more training and support
for those who will assist the ‘‘entrepreneur,’’ including advice about their
legal status and rights? For example, Binkley (2002) has observed that the
income support and retraining programs designed to assist those impacted
by the fisheries crisis on the Canadian East Coast were delivered only to
licensed fishers, overwhelmingly men. They provided nothing to the wives
who had been intimately involved in operating the family fishing business
as shore crew or managers, failing to recognize the contributions and the
economic losses of unpaid family members (Binkley 2002: 10 – 11). Making
these questions visible, and developing answers to them, depends upon
generating new theoretical and empirical knowledge about unpaid market
labor.
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NOTE
1

While the Court cited this definition from the Partnership Act of Manitoba, the
definition is very similar in other provinces including Ontario where the Wessells
carried on business.
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